

**CAN WE CONNECT SOME INTELLECTUAL DOTS?**

**Comments on Jane Gingrich, Memo on the Politics of  
Education, Equity and the Future of Prosperity**

E

**Bill Lazonick**

**The Academic-Industry Research Network**


**CIFAR Fellow**

**CIFAR: INNOVATION, EQUITY, & THE FUTURE OF PROSPERITY**

**November 19, 2020**

## OYSTER:

# Labor: a replaceable commodity or a productive asset?



**Marx:** Growth of the firm depends on profits that capitalists extract from commoditized labor, intensifying work effort for a given wage

**Inaccurate depiction of employment in 19<sup>th</sup> century Britain: skilled workers shared in productivity gains derived from effort-saving technological change (Lazonick, *CJE*, 1979)**

**Penrose:** Growth of the firm through collective and cumulative learning by white-collar workers who share in productivity gains through careers with one company (Lazonick, INET WP, 2020)

**Analyzed the large US corporation in the 1950s, when it was delivering, for white males at least, relatively equitable and stable economic growth**



# POUND: How does the Gingrich approach relate to “the investment triad”?


Stable and equitable economic growth depends on  
*investments in productive capabilities*

- **HOUSEHOLD UNITS** as “supportive families” invest in equipping future workers for productive lives
- **GOVERNMENT AGENCIES** as “developmental states” invest in infrastructure and knowledge
- **BUSINESS FIRMS** as “innovative enterprises” invest in value-creating processes & products, including investing in people

## **FROM THE TRIAD TO INNOVATION TO PRODUCTIVITY**

The triadic interactions of these **organizations**  
to develop and utilize productive capabilities  
to generate high-quality, low-cost goods and services

# PICASSO: Social conditions of innovative enterprise (please steal this framework)



# Extreme increase in US economic inequality since the late 1970s


**The “maximizing  
shareholder value” era of  
unstable employment,  
inequitable income, and  
sagging productivity**

Gini Index for All Families

0.46  
0.44  
0.42  
0.4  
0.38  
0.36  
0.34

1947 1950 1953 1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019

Gini Index, all US families  
1947-2019




# Concentration of income at the top in the PVE era

INCOME GROWTH  
Over previous 34 years

**Skill-biased technical change?  
(I don't think so.)**

**But now, the very affluent  
(the 99.99th percentile)  
see the largest income growth.**

**The poor and middle  
class used to see the  
largest income growth.**




Note: Inflation-adjusted annual average growth using income after taxes, transfers and non-cash benefits.

Source: David Leonhardt, "Our broken economy, in one simple chart," New York Times, August 7, 2017, at <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/07/opinion/leonhardt-income-inequality.html>.

# The growing productivity-pay gap

The gap between productivity and a typical worker's compensation has increased dramatically since 1979

Productivity growth and hourly compensation growth, 1948–2018




# Large corporations dominate the U.S. economy

## Economic performance depends on resource allocation by organizations, with markets as outcomes

2017	Firms	Establishments	Paid employees	Annual payroll	Annual revenues	No. of firms	Ave. no. of employees
	No.	No.	No.	\$ billions	\$ billions		
All firms	5,996,900	7,860,674	128,591,812	6,725	37,414	5,996,900	21
Percent of all firms	%	%	%	%	%		
<5 employees	61.67	47.1	4.6	4.1	4.1	3,698,086	1.6
5-19 employees	27.38	21.5	11.8	8.8	7.5	1,641,832	9.2
20-99 employees	9.08	9.4	16.6	13.8	11.7	544,485	39
100-499 employees	1.54	4.9	14.1	13.6	12.2	92,358	196
500+ employees	0.34	17.1	52.9	59.7	64.4	20,139	3,378
5,000+ employees	0.04	11.5	35.0	40.0	46.0	2,156	20,859
10,000+ employees	0.02	9.8	29.3	33.2	na	1,100	34,308
20,000+ employees	0.01	7.7	23.0	25.1	na	514	57,428

- **U.S. productivity, income, and employment depend on resource allocation by large corporations. The foundation of human and physical capital formation is retained earnings, not stock markets. Think employment relations, not labor markets.**
- **Do the largest, most profitable, corporations Retain-and-Reinvest, Dominate-and-Distribute, or Downsize-and-Distribute?**






**Career employment:  
Key driver of the  
productivity-pay relation**

**Old Economy Business Model**

**Career-with-one-company  
norm: employees share in  
profits through job security,  
pay raises, defined-benefit  
pensions, and health coverage**



**New Economy Business Model**

**Insecure jobs, globalized labor,  
defined-contribution pensions**


**Massive stock buybacks,  
exploding top executive pay,  
billionaire hedge-fund activists**

**Disappearance of careers in  
companies means the erosion  
of middle-class employment  
opportunities**


# Putting economists' faces on the productivity-pay gap

**The gap between productivity and a typical worker's compensation has increased dramatically since 1973**

Productivity growth and hourly compensation growth, 1948–2017



# PVE in the name of “maximizing shareholder value”



## 25 largest repurchasers 2010-2019

**\$2.0 trillion in buybacks**  
**(38% of all corporate**  
**buybacks)**


**Research agenda:**  
**how buybacks**  
**undermine equitable and**  
**stable growth**  
**in particular industries**  
**and companies within**  
**those industries**

## **S&P 500 Index** **2010-2019**

**\$5.3 trillion in BBs**  
**54% of NI**  
**\$3.8 trillion in DVs**  
**39% of NI**


<b>RANK</b>	<b>COMPANY</b>	<b>BUYBACKs</b> <b>2010-2019</b> <b>\$billions</b>	<b>BB/NI</b> <b>%</b>	<b>DV/NI</b> <b>%</b>	<b>(BB+DV)/NI</b> <b>%</b>
1	APPLE	<b>320</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>97</b>
2	ORACLE	<b>119</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>151</b>
3	MICROSOFT	<b>113</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>98</b>
4	JPMORGAN CHASE	<b>97</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>70</b>
5	WELLS FARGO	<b>93</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>81</b>
6	EXXON MOBIL	<b>92</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>80</b>
7	IBM	<b>89</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>108</b>
8	CISCO SYSTEMS	<b>86</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>150</b>
9	PFIZER	<b>77</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>116</b>
10	BANK OF AMERICA	<b>73</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>86</b>
11	WALMART.	<b>70</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>91</b>
12	INTEL	<b>68</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>88</b>
13	HOME DEPOT	<b>64</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>137</b>
14	CITIGROUP	<b>63</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>73</b>
15	JOHNSON & JOHNSON	<b>62</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>110</b>
16	GOLDMAN SACHS	<b>56</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>100</b>
17	QUALCOMM	<b>55</b>	<b>133</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>192</b>
18	PROCTER & GAMBLE	<b>55</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>117</b>
19	ALPHABET	<b>52</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>31</b>
20	AMGEN	<b>52</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>130</b>
21	AIG	<b>49</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>126</b>
22	WALT DISNEY	<b>48</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>85</b>
23	VISA	<b>47</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>96</b>
24	MERCK	<b>46</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>172</b>
25	MCDONALD'S	<b>46</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>145</b>

# PVE and the “salaried” incomes of the top 0.1%, 1916-2011



# Value-extracting insiders: Average total pay and % shares of pay components, 500 highest-paid US executives, 2006-2019

**High executive pay comes from realized gains from exercising stock options and vesting of stock awards.**



# Value-extracting outsiders: Highest-paid hedge-fund managers 2016 (activists underlined)


Name	Hedge Fund	Take-Home Pay
James Simons	Renaissance Technologies	\$1.5 billion
Michael Platt	BlueCrest Capital Management	\$1.1 billion
Raymond Dalio	Bridgewater Associates	\$1 billion
<u>David Tepper</u>	<u>Appaloosa Management</u>	<u>\$800 million</u>
Kenneth Griffin	Citadel LLC	\$500 million
<u>Daniel Loeb</u>	<u>Third Point</u>	<u>\$400 million</u>
Paul Singer	Point72	\$375 million
David Shaw	D.E. Shaw & Co.	\$375 million
John Overton	Two Sigma Investments	\$375 million
David Siegel	Two Sigma	\$375 million
Michael Hintze	Man AHL	\$325 million
Jeffrey Talpins	Man AHL	\$300 million
Stanley Druckenmiller	Renaissance Family Office	\$300 million
<u>Brett Icahn</u>	<u>Icahn Capital Management</u>	<u>\$280 million</u>
<u>David Schechter</u>	<u>Icahn Capital Management</u>	<u>\$280 million</u>

**Take-home pay of the top 15 hedge-fund managers, USA, 2016 (top15 average=\$606 million)**

**Top15 corporate executives in 2016  
Average total pay=\$120 million (93% stock-based)  
Range: \$83 million to \$220 million**

# Semiconductors: Realized gains from broad-based employee stock options

Figure 2.5 Real Wages (in 2000 dollars) in the Semiconductor Industry, United States, Silicon Valley, Route 128, Dallas, and Oregon, 1994–2006



NOTE: SIC 3674 for 1994–1997; NAICS 334413 and 334611 for 1998–2006.


SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2008a).

Source of graph:  
Lazonick, *Sustainable Prosperity in the New Economy?* Upjohn Institute, 2009



# Software: Realized gains from broad-based employee stock options

**Figure 2.6 Real Wages (in 2000 dollars) in Software Publishing, United States, Silicon Valley, Route 128, Dallas, and Washington State, 1994–2006**



**The labor market meets the stock market in the employment relations of high-tech firms**

Source of graph:  
Lazonick, *Sustainable Prosperity in the New Economy?* Upjohn Institute, 2009

NOTE: SIC 7372 for 1994–1997; NAICS 511210 for 1998–2006.

SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2008a).

# Broad-based stock options as a source of US economic inequality

**Table 2.3 Average Gains (in U.S. dollars) per Employee (excluding the top five) from the Exercise of Stock Options, Selected U.S. ICT Companies, 1995–2007**

	AMD	CSCO	DELL	HPQ	INTC	IBM	LU	MSFT	MOT	ORCL	JAVA	TXN
1995	1,086	60,894	3,833	2,362	18,746	671		51,829	—	—	2,468	2,136
1996	1,490	93,399	7,194	2,213	16,010	1,823	—	79,022	471	7,367	7,992	892
1997	5,075	85,159	11,219	3,156	25,295	3,615	1,019	154,196	1,058	6,588	7,626	2,932
1998	1,435	92,947	40,547	2,676	75,890	4,066	5,449	238,377	361	5,019	10,799	4,473
1999	1,687	193,476	126,639	6,613	56,589	5,790	7,505	369,693	4,055	5,650	27,477	47,880
2000	20,113	290,870	84,818	17,987	112,018	4,200	23,281	449,142	3,218	37,214	60,431	22,881
2001	2,115	105,865	76,122	1,498	18,235	4,011	828	143,772	415	88,723	46,763	6,767
2002	537	13596	33167	838	10413	1195	955	95310	334	6950	4550	4,650
2003	1,163	8,917	10,739	936	10,406	1,553	11	80,283	42	6,193	1,182	4,803
2004	5,103	32,804	12,216	638	8,405	1,842	486	50,690	1,381	7,908	1,960	6,144
2005	12,786	24,432	11,297	1,739	8,347	1,256	615	14,500	8,688	6,926	1,187	12,512
2006	18,197	25,487	8,724	6,809	3,396	1,857	558	6,208	3,852	9,514	1,249	11,142
2007	1,149	73,004	221	9,982	6,915	3,524		14,991	4,395	14,927	2,740	19,209

NOTE: See Table 2.2 for company ticker abbreviations. — = not available.


SOURCE: Company 10-K filings.

## Employment in 2000

AMD	CSCO	DELL	HPQ	INTC	IBM	LU	MSFT	MOT	ORCL	JAVA	TXN
14,696	34,000	36,500	88,500	86,100	316,309	126,000	39,100	147,000	41,320	38,900	42,481

Source of table: Lazonick, *Sustainable Prosperity in the New Economy?* Upjohn Institute, 2009

# The disappearing middle class



Source: Federal Reserve of Dt. Louis (FRED)

# Rationalization of blue-collar work

## **1980s: Rationalization:**

### **Plant closings & permanent layoffs of blue-collar workers**

- **Computer technology did not close down the plants; Japanese competition, including robotics, did** in industries such as steel, machine tools, microelectronics, consumer electronics, and automobiles in which US corporations had been dominant
- **The Achilles heel of US manufacturing:** lack of collective and cumulative learning that extended to the shop floor
- **It was the Japanese with their institution of permanent employment that became the world leaders in robotics**

# Marketization of white-collar work

## 1990s: Marketization:

### end of the career-with-one company norm

- **IBM exemplified the OEBM employment model, claiming in the late 1980s that it had not laid off anyone involuntarily since 1921**
- **In response to the new “open systems” environment in which more experienced employees were less valued, IBM reduced employment from 374,000 in 1990 to 220,000 in 1994**
- **By about 2000, almost all established companies had followed suit putting an end to the norm of a career with one company, manifested by the transition from defined-benefit to defined contribution pensions.**

# Globalization: U.S. blue-collar & white-collar workers more vulnerable in global competition

## 2000s: Globalization:

Acceleration in the numbers of educated, capable, lower-wage labor employed abroad, especially in Asia

- **From 1960s**, offshoring of chip assembly and testing to Asian countries, where US companies employed indigenous (male) managers and engineers along with (female) operatives
- **Accumulation of qualified high-tech personnel** in Asia, through global and/or domestic employment career paths with MNCs and an increasing scale, indigenous companies
- **Immigration Act of 1990** favors entry to the U.S. of college-educated Asians, especially with engineering and science degrees as permanent residents and on H-1B and L-1 “temporary” visas (up to 7 years with a path to citizenship)

# Financialization

- **1960s: conglomerate movement:** “a good manager can manage anything”; companies bought and sold for financial gain
- **1970s: transformation of Wall Street from investing to trading:** NASDAQ, 1971; junk bonds from decline of conglomerates; end of fixed commissions on NYSE; emergence of derivatives
- **1980s: the Deal Decade:** SEC Rule 10b-18 as a “license to loot”, corporate raiders; junk-bond funded takeovers; emergence of MSV as an ideology of corporate governance
- **1990s: triumph of NEBM and Internet boom:** broad-based stock options; VC-backed startups; boom in DC pensions
- **2000s: search for higher yields:** quadrupling of S&P 500 buybacks, 2003-07; subprime lending and the financial crisis
- **2010s: rise of shareholder activism and the era of predatory value extraction:** financialization exploits the vulnerability of rationalization, marketization, globalization; TRUMP

# Investment in education is a foundation of economic development

Post-secondary school completion rates and average years of schooling,  
1960, 1980, 2000, and 2010, selected nations

Country pop., 25yrs.+	Completed post-secondary %				Average years of school			
	<u>1960</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>2000</u>	<u>2010</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>2000</u>	<u>2010</u>
<b>USA</b>	9.4	18.1	30.6	31.6	8.9	11.9	13.0	13.3
<b>Japan</b>	3.0	8.9	19.0	23.9	7.2	8.9	10.7	11.5
<b>Hong Kong</b>	3.1	4.1	7.2	7.2	4.4	6.7	8.7	10.0
<b>Singapore</b>	0.9	2.1	7.8	12.3	2.8	3.7	7.6	8.8
<b>South Korea</b>	1.9	6.6	14.8	17.3	3.2	7.3	10.6	11.6
<b>Taiwan</b>	2.4	4.7	8.0	10.6	4.6	6.4	9.6	11.0
<b>Indonesia</b>	0.1	0.3	1.7	1.6	1.1	3.1	4.8	5.8
<b>Malaysia</b>	0.7	0.5	3.1	5.0	2.3	4.4	8.2	9.5
<b>Philippines</b>	4.5	9.8	19.8	22.4	3.7	6.1	8.0	8.7
<b>Thailand</b>	0.4	2.9	5.1	8.9	3.4	3.7	5.4	6.6
<b>Brazil</b>	1.1	3.7	5.3	5.2	1.8	2.6	5.6	7.2
<b>Mexico</b>	1.1	3.9	10.2	13.9	2.6	4.0	7.4	8.5
<b>Chile</b>	1.8	3.3	9.5	11.6	5.0	6.4	8.8	9.7
<b>Costa Rica</b>	2.1	5.2	12.9	13.2	3.7	5.4	8.0	8.4
<b>China</b>	0.4	0.6	2.8	4.0	1.4	3.7	6.6	7.5
<b>India</b>	0.4	1.5	3.2	3.7	0.9	1.9	3.6	4.4

Table source: Li and Lazonick 2020; data source: Barro and Lee website



# U.S. Performance for International Assessment (PISA) mean scores, by race and ethnicity and compared with the OECD average, 2000-2015

Source: Lazonick, Moss & Weitz 2020

	2000		2003		2006		2009		2012		2015	
<b>READING</b>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>s.e</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>s.e</i>	<i>Not administered</i>		<i>Mean</i>	<i>s.e</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>s.e</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>s.e</i>
White	538	5.1	525	2.6			525	3.8	519	4.1	526	3.3
Black	445	8.2	430	5.6			441	7.2	443	8.3	443	5.4
Hispanic	449	7.6	453	5.9			466	4.3	478	4.5	478	5.7
Asian	546	15.8	513	9.2			541	9.4	550	8.1	527	13.3
Multiracial	na	na	515	7.3			502	6.4	517	7.6	498	7.1
U.S. Average	504	7.0	495	3.2			500	3.7	498	3.7	497	3.4
OECD Average	492	0.7	494	0.6			493	0.5	496	0.5	493	0.5
<b>MATHEMATICS</b>	<i>Not administered</i>		<i>Mean</i>	<i>s.e</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>s.e</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>s.e</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>s.e</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>s.e</i>
White			512	2.5	502	3.1	515	3.9	506	3.7	499	2.8
Black			417	5.1	404	8.9	423	6.6	421	6.2	419	4.7
Hispanic			443	5.1	436	4.5	453	3.8	455	4.8	446	5.2
Asian			506	9.8	494	8.7	524	9.6	549	9.0	498	10.1
Multiracial			502	6.4	482	7.6	487	6.4	492	7.4	475	7.0
U.S. Average			483	2.9	474	4.0	487	3.6	481	3.6	470	3.2
OECD Average			499	0.6	494	0.5	495	0.5	494	0.5	490	0.4
<b>SCIENCE</b>	<i>Not administered</i>		<i>Not administered</i>		<i>Mean</i>	<i>s.e</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>s.e</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>s.e</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>s.e</i>
White					523	3.0	532	4.0	528	3.7	531	2.8
Black					409	8.8	435	7.2	439	6.8	433	4.9
Hispanic					439	4.7	464	3.8	462	4.7	470	4.8
Asian					499	9.7	536	9.7	546	8.6	525	12.0
Multiracial					501	8.0	503	7.6	511	7.8	503	6.4
U.S. Average					489	4.2	502	3.6	497	3.8	496	3.2
OECD Average					498	0.5	501	0.5	501	0.5	493	0.4

# Racial and ethnic divides in high-tech employment

## Racial and ethnic composition of upper-level occupational categories in high-tech industries and all U.S. industries, 2014

	White, %	Black, %	Hispanic, %	Asian, %	Number of employees
<u>High tech only</u>					
Executives, senior officials and managers	83.31	1.92	3.11	10.55	139,575
First/mid officials and managers	76.53	4.12	4.91	12.98	761,380
Professionals	68.03	5.27	5.28	19.49	2,321,969
Technicians	68.58	9.01	10.23	9.68	452,359
<u>All U.S. industries</u>					
Executives, senior officials and managers	86.97	3.13	3.87	4.88	833,367
First/mid officials and managers	77.53	7.12	7.43	6.31	4,766,041
Professionals	72.89	7.64	5.79	11.74	10,534,689
Technicians	67.17	13.79	10.09	6.56	2,870,353

Source: U.S. Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, "Diversity in High Tech," p. 20.

## Racial and ethnic composition of upper-level occupational categories in San Francisco Metropolitan Area and Santa Clara County, 2014

	White %	Black %	Hispanic %	Asian %	Other %
<u>San Francisco Metropolitan Area</u>					
Executives, senior officials and managers	76.41	1.16	2.79	17.86	1.78
First/mid officials and managers	62.43	2.31	4.69	28.25	2.32
Professionals	52.59	2.45	4.99	37.20	2.77
Technicians	40.08	6.59	12.38	36.54	4.41
<u>Santa Clara County</u>					
Executives, senior officials and managers	61.90	0.86	3.14	32.92	1.18
First/mid officials and managers	53.70	1.48	4.52	38.49	1.81
Professionals	39.32	1.52	3.97	51.15	4.04
Technicians	41.03	7.82	11.91	34.69	3.55

Source: U.S. Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, "Diversity in High Tech," p. 25.

Table source: Lazonick, Moss & Weitz 2020